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1 Introduction
An n-person game in characteristic function form or a transferable utility (TU) game is a
pair 〈N, v〉 where N = {1, 2, · · · , n} and v is a function v : 2N → R, such that v(∅) = 0. N
represents the player set and 2N denotes the family of all subsets of N . An element i ∈ N
and a subset S ∈ 2N with S 6= ∅ are called a player and a coalition respectively, and the
associated real number v(S) is called the worth of coalition S. The size of coalition S is
denoted by s. Particularly, n denotes the size of the player set N . Let GN denote the game
space consisting of all TU-games with player set N and let G denote the union of all spaces
GN , when N is arbitrary. In this paper, a TU-game 〈N, v〉 is always denoted by its column
vector of worths of all coalitions S ⊆ N in the traditional order (one-person coalitions are at
the top, etc.), i.e. ~v = (v(S))S⊆N,S 6=∅. If no confusion arises, we write v instead of ~v.
The solution part of cooperative game theory deals with the allocation problem of how to
divide the overall earnings the amount of v(N) among the players in the TU-game. There
∗The research for this paper was done during a three months stay (February 14, 2006 till May 10, 2006) of
the first author at the EEMCS, University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands.
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is associated a single allocation called the value of the TU-game. Formally, a value on GN
is a function Φ that assigns a single payoff vector Φ(N, v) = (Φi(N, v))i∈N ∈ R
n to every
TU-game 〈N, v〉 ∈ GN . The so-called value Φi(N, v) of player i in the game 〈N, v〉 represents
an assessment by i of his or her gains for participating in the game. A value Φ on the universal
game space G is said to be efficient, if
∑
i∈N Φi(N, v) = v(N) for all games 〈N, v〉.
Among all the values for TU-games, the Shapley value is the best known ([2, 7]). The
familiar formula for the Shapley value Sh(N, v) of a game 〈N, v〉 is as follows:
Shi(N, v) =
∑
S⊆N,S∋i
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
[
v(S)− v(S \ {i})
]
for all i ∈ N.
We exploit later an alternative formula for the Shapley value due to Driessen [1]. The Shapley
value Sh(N, v) of a game 〈N, v〉 is equal to
Shi(N, v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
[
v(N \ S)− v(S)
]
for all i ∈ N.
A semivalue SE(N, v) for a game 〈N, v〉 is introduced by Dubey et al. in [4], which is of the
form
SEi(N, v) =
∑
S⊆N,S∋i
pns
[
v(S)− v(S \ {i})
]
for all i ∈ N,
where pn = (pn1 , p
n
2 , · · · , p
n
n) is a nonnegative vector verifying the normalization condition
n∑
s=1
(
n− 1
s− 1
)
pns = 1.
That is, pn is a probability distribution over coalitions containing player i which assigns the
same probability to coalitions of the same size. Thus, a semivalue allocates to each player his
or her expected marginal contribution according to the probability distribution pn. Clearly,
for
pns =
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
, s = 1, 2, · · · , n,
we get the particular semivalue, precisely the Shapley value. It is easy to see that the nor-
malization condition is satisfied in this case, and it is obvious that there are many more
semivalues.
To define the semivalues on the universal game space G, we need a sequence of weight
vectors {pn}∞n=1 all satisfying the above normalization condition. To make sure that a game
〈N, v〉 can be extended to a new game 〈N ∪{d}, v〉, where d is a new but dummy player, for a
semivalue SE, in the new game any player i ∈ N should get the same outcome to the original
game. So there are some recursive relationships between the weight vectors pn and pn+1 for
semivalues as
pns = p
n+1
s + p
n+1
s+1 , s = 1, 2, · · · , n.
We call it the inverse Pascal triangle conditions. It is easy to see that these relationships
hold for the weight vectors of the Shapley value. As a result, for all t ≤ n weight vectors pt
are uniquely determined by pn and the inverse Pascal triangle conditions. Moreover, if the
normalization condition for GN holds, then from the inverse Pascal triangle relations we get
the normalization condition satisfied for all GT , T ⊆ N .
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In general, semivalues do not satisfy efficiency. In fact the Shapley value is the unique
efficient semivalue, and this is a crucial requirement if one is looking for a solution that can
be accepted by all the players. This motivated Ruiz et al. to consider additive efficient
normalization for semivalues ([6]) as
ESEi(N, v) = SEi(N, v) + α for all i ∈ N,
with the additive efficiency term α =
1
n
[
v(N) −
∑
i∈N
SEi(N, v)
]
such that ESE(N, v) is
efficient. The purpose of this paper is to derive the relationship between the additive efficient
normalization of semivalues and the Shapley value, then establish a new axiomatization for
the additive efficient normalization of semivalues.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In section 2, by matrix approach we derive
the explicit relationship between the additive efficient normalization of semivalues and the
Shapley value. In section 3, the p−reduced game associated with the weight vector pn is
introduced. Based on the relationship, we axiomatize the additive efficient normalization
of semivalues as the unique solution verifying COV, SYM, and RGP with respect to the
p−reduced game.
2 The relationship between the additive efficient normaliza-
tion of semivalues and the Shapley value by matrix approach
Because of the linearity of a semivalue and its efficient normalization, it is desirable using
matrix approach to analyze the efficient normalization of a semivalue. In [9], we introduce the
notion of row (resp. column)-coalitional matrix in the framework of cooperative game theory,
and matrix approach is adopted to develop some properties of the Shapley value ([9, 10]).
Let us recall the notion of coalitional matrix in order to represent any semivalue by means
of a column-coalitional matrix in terms of the corresponding weight vector pn as follows.
Definition 1 (cf. [9]). A matrix M is called a column (resp. row)-coalitional matrix if its
columns (resp. rows) are indexed by coalitions S ⊆ N in the traditional order (one-person
coalitions are at the front, etc.).
Definition 2. Given any game 〈N, v〉, the semivalue SE(N, v) corresponding to the weight
vector pn can be represented by its semivalue standard matrix MSE as:
SE(N, v) = MSEv,
where the semivalue standard matrix MSE =
[
MSE
]
i∈N,S⊆N,S 6=∅
is column-coalitional defined
by [
MSE
]
i,S
=
{
pns , if i ∈ S;
−pns+1, if i /∈ S.
So the semivalue SEi(N, v) of player i is just the inner-product of the row vector M
SE
i−row
and the column vector v of coalitional worths. Especially, for the Shapley value we have the
following representation.
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Definition 3 (cf. [9]). Given any game 〈N, v〉, the Shapley value Sh(N, v) can be represented
by the Shapley standard matrix MSh as:
Sh(N, v) = MShv,
where the Shapley standard matrix MSh =
[
MSh
]
i∈N,S⊆N,S 6=∅
is column-coalitional defined
by
[
MSh
]
i,S
=


(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
, if i ∈ S;
−
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
, if i /∈ S.
For a given semivalue SE(N, v), let ~α ∈ Rn be the column vector with every entry being
the additive efficiency term α. We call it the additive efficiency vector of SE(N, v) and its
matrix representation is listed in the next lemma.
Lemma 2.1. The additive efficiency vector ~α of a semivalue SE(N, v) verifies ~α = Av, where
the column-coalitional matrix A =
[
A
]
i∈N,S⊆N,S 6=∅
is given by
[
A
]
i,S
=
{
n−s
n p
n
s+1 −
s
np
n
s , if S 6= N ;
1
n − p
n
n, if S = N.
Proof. By Definition 2,
∑
i∈N
SEi(N, v) =
∑
i∈N
( ∑
S⊆N,S 6=∅
[
MSE
]
i,S
v(S)
)
=
∑
S⊆N,S 6=∅
(∑
i∈N
[
MSE
]
i,S
)
v(S)
=
∑
S$N,S 6=∅
(∑
i∈S
[
MSE
]
i,S
+
∑
i/∈S
[
MSE
]
i,S
)
v(S) +
∑
i∈N
[
MSE
]
i,N
v(N)
=
∑
S$N,S 6=∅
[
spns − (n− s)p
n
s+1
]
v(S) + npnnv(N).
So the additive efficiency term α of the semivalue SE(N, v) is determined by
α =
1
n
[
v(N)−
∑
i∈N
SEi(N, v)
]
=
1
n
∑
S$N,S 6=∅
[
(n− s)pns+1 − sp
n
s
]
v(S) +
( 1
n
− pnn
)
v(N).
It follows that ~α = Av, where the column-coalitional matrix A as given above.
Now, for a given semivalue SE(N, v), the algebraic representation of its additive efficient
normalization ESE(N, v) is as follows.
Theorem 2.2. Let SE(N, v) be a semivalue. Then its additive efficient normalization verifies
ESE(N, v) = MESEv, where the column-coalitional matrix MESE =
[
MESE
]
i∈N,S⊆N,S 6=∅
is
given by
[
MESE
]
i,S
=


n−s
n p
n−1
s , if i ∈ S, S 6= N ;
− snp
n−1
s , if i /∈ S;
1
n , if S = N.
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Proof. Firstly, by Definition 2 and Lemma 2.1,
ESE(N, v) = SE(N, v) + ~α = MSEv +Av = (MSE +A)v.
It remains to prove MSE + A = MESE . Let i ∈ N and S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅. We distinguish three
cases. If S = N ,
[
MSE
]
i,N
+
[
A
]
i,N
= pnn +
1
n
− pnn =
1
n
=
[
MESE
]
i,N
;
by the inverse Pascal triangle conditions, if i ∈ S and S 6= N ,
[
MSE
]
i,S
+
[
A
]
i,S
= pns +
n− s
n
pns+1 −
s
n
pns =
n− s
n
(pns+1 + p
n
s ) =
n− s
n
pn−1s =
[
MESE
]
i,S
;
and if i /∈ S,
[
MSE
]
i,S
+
[
A
]
i,S
= −pns+1 +
n− s
n
pns+1 −
s
n
pns = −
s
n
(pns+1 + p
n
s ) = −
s
n
pn−1s =
[
MESE
]
i,S
.
This completes the proof.
Let B = {bns
∣∣ n ∈ N\{0, 1}, s = 1, 2, · · · , n} denote a collection of non-negative constants,
whereas bnn = 1. Now we treat the relationship of the additive efficient normalization of a
semivalue to the Shapley value in matrix language by specifying the collection of nonnegative
constants B.
Theorem 2.3. MESE = MShB, where B = diag(bn|S|)S⊆N,S 6=∅ is the B−scaling diagonal
matrix such that bnn = 1 and b
n
s = s
(
n−1
s
)
pn−1s for all 1 ≤ s ≤ n− 1.
Proof. Let us check the entry equalities
[
MShB
]
i,S
=
[
MESE
]
i,S
for all i ∈ N and S ⊆ N ,
S 6= ∅. By the definition of the Shapley standard matrix MSh and the B−scaling diagonal
matrix B,
[
MShB
]
i,S
=
∑
T⊆N,T 6=∅
[
MSh
]
i,T
[
B
]
T,S
=
[
MSh
]
i,S
[
B
]
S,S
=
[
MSh
]
i,S
· bns .
We distinguish three cases. If S = N ,
[
MShB
]
i,N
=
[
MSh
]
i,N
· bnn =
1
n
· 1 =
1
n
=
[
MESE
]
i,N
;
if i ∈ S and S 6= N ,
[
MShB
]
i,S
=
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
·
(n− 1)!
(s− 1)!(n− s− 1)!
pn−1s =
n− s
n
pn−1s =
[
MESE
]
i,S
;
and if i /∈ S,
[
MShB
]
i,S
= −
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
·
(n− 1)!
(s− 1)!(n− s− 1)!
pn−1s = −
s
n
pn−1s =
[
MESE
]
i,S
.
We conclude that MShB = MESE .
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Remark 1. Given the relationship bnn = 1 and b
n
s = s
(
n−1
s
)
pn−1s for all 1 ≤ s ≤ n − 1,
we remark that the normalization condition and the inverse Pascal triangle condition for the
probability distribution pn−1 can be reformulated as
n∑
s=1
bns = n, and b
n
s =
(
1−
s
n
)
bn+1s +
s
n
bn+1s+1 , s = 1, 2, · · · , n− 1.
Here the sum of two subsequent probabilities is replaced by a certain convex combination
of the corresponding constants in B. In case the latter condition holds up to s = n, then
together with bnn = 1, this implies b
n
s = 1 for all 1 ≤ s ≤ n, as well as ESE(N, v) =
SE(N, v) = Sh(N, v).
It is easy to see that the additive efficient normalization of a semivalue verifies efficiency,
symmetry, and linearity. And the result in Theorem 2.3 agree with the following.
Theorem 2.4 (cf. [3, 9]). A value ψ on the game space GN verifies efficiency, symmetry,
and linearity if and only if there exists a B−scaling diagonal matrix B = diag(bn|S|)S⊆N,S 6=∅
such that, for any game 〈N, v〉, the value ψ(N, v) = Sh(N,Bv) = MShBv.
Here the game 〈N,Bv〉 called B−scaled game of a given game 〈N, v〉. Driessen introduced
this game in [3] as (Bv)(∅) := 0 and (Bv)(S) := bns v(S) for all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅. In terms of the
B−scaling diagonal matrix B we can rewrite the B−scaled version of the game 〈N, v〉 as
Bv = B · v where B = diag(bn|S|)S⊆N,S 6=∅.
Since ESE(N, v) = MESEv and Sh(N,Bv) = MShBv, the additive efficient normalization
ESE(N, v) of a game 〈N, v〉 is the Shapley value of the B−scaled version 〈N,Bv〉. That is,
Corollary 2.5. For any game 〈N, v〉, the additive efficient normalization ESE(N, v) of the
semivalue SE(N, v) associated with pn is the Shapley value of the corresponding B−scaled
game 〈N,Bv〉.
And form the alternative formula for the Shapley value due to Driessen [1]
Shi(N, v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
[
v(N \ S)− v(S)
]
for all i ∈ N,
we have
Corollary 2.6. For any game 〈N, v〉, the additive efficient normalization ESE(N, v) of the
semivalue SE(N, v) associated with pn is
ESEi(N, v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
[
bnn−sv(N \ S)− b
n
s v(S)
]
for all i ∈ N.
And this formula is a key for proving the main result of Theorem 3.5.
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3 Consistency of the additive efficient normalization of semi-
values
The consistency principle of a value on G is a concept associated with a notion of reduced
game. Given any game 〈N, v〉, any coalition S ⊂ N , and any payoff vector ~x ∈ RN , there are
various ways to define a reduced game 〈S, vR(S,~x)〉 with respect to ~x, which is given in terms of
the original characteristic function v and the payoff vector ~x. Informally speaking a value ψ is
said to be consistent or possess the reduced game property (RGP) with respect to a specified
type of reduced games whenever the next condition is satisfied:
ψj(S, v
R
(S,~x)) = ψj(N, v) for all j ∈ S, where ~x = ψ(N, v).
Generally speaking, the consistency (RGP) is a very powerful and widely used tool to axiom-
atize game-theoretic solutions (see the surveys on consistency in [2, 5]).
Firstly, let us mention a type of reduced game considered by Sobolev in order to axiomatize
the Shapley value on G.
Definition 4 (cf. [8]). Given a game 〈N, v〉, a player i ∈ N and any payoff vector ~x ∈ RN ,
the corresponding reduced game 〈N \ {i}, vR(N\{i},~x)〉 with respect to ~x is defined as
vR(N\{i},~x)(S) =
(
1−
s
n− 1
)
v(S) +
s
n− 1
[
v(S ∪{i})−xi
]
for all S ⊆ N \ {i}, S 6= ∅, (3.1)
where xi is the payment of player i according to ~x.
Note that the worth of any coalition in the above reduced game is obtained as a convex
combination of the worth of the coalition in the original game and the original worth of
the coalition together with the single player minus the payoff xi to the single player i for
his participation. Sobolev showed the consistency of the Shapley value with respect to this
reduced game 〈N \ {i}, vR(N\{i},~x)〉 as
Shj(N \ {i}, v
R
(N\{i},~x)) = Shj(N, v) for all j ∈ N \ {i}, where ~x = Sh(N, v).
A value ψ is said to be covariant (COV) whenever the next condition is satisfied: For any
game 〈N, v〉, and for any α > 0, β ∈ RN , we have ψ(N,αv + β) = αψ(N, v) + β. Here the
game 〈N,αv + β〉 is given by (αv + β)(S) := αv(S) +
∑
j∈S βj for all S ⊆ N .
A value ψ is said to be symmetric (SYM) whenever the next condition is satisfied: For
any game 〈N, v〉, any player i ∈ N , and for any permutation π on N , we have ψπi(N, πv) =
ψi(N, v). Here the game 〈N, πv〉 is given by (πv)(πS) := v(S) for all S ⊆ N .
Theorem 3.1 (cf. [8]). The Shapley value is the unique value on G which possesses COV,
SYM, and RGP with respect to the reduced game of (3.1).
In order to investigate the consistency of the additive efficient normalization of semivalues,
we introduce the following reduced game.
Definition 5. Given a game 〈N, v〉, a player i ∈ N and any payoff vector ~x ∈ RN , the
p−reduced game 〈N \ {i}, vRp(N\{i},~x)〉 with respect to ~x is defined as
vRp(N\{i},~x)(S) =


v(N)− xi, if S = N \ {i};
pn−1s
pn−2s
v(S) +
pn−1s+1
pn−2s
[
v(S ∪ {i})− 1
pn−1s+1
· xi
(n−1)(n−2s )
]
, if S ⊂ N \ {i}, S 6= ∅,
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or equivalently,
vRp(N\{i},~x)(S) =
(
1−
s
n− 1
) bns
bn−1s
v(S)+
s
n− 1
[ bns+1
bn−1s
v(S∪{i})−
xi
bn−1s
]
for all S ⊆ N\{i}, S 6= ∅,
(3.2)
where xi is the payment of player i according to ~x, b
n
s = s
(
n−1
s
)
pn−1s for all 1 ≤ s ≤ n− 1 and
bnn = 1.
Since pn−1s + p
n−1
s+1 = p
n−2
s , here the worth of any coalition in the p−reduced game is also
obtained as a convex combination of the worth of the coalition in the original game and
the original worth of the coalition together with the single player minus the revised-payoff
1
pn−1s+1
· xi
(n−1)(n−2s )
to the single player i for his participation.
Proposition 3.2. The p−reduced game is path-independent, i.e., for any game 〈N, v〉 with
n ≥ 3, any pair of players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, and any payoff vector ~x ∈ RN , it holds that
(
vRp(N\{i},~x)
)Rp
(N\{i,j},~x)
(S) =
(
vRp(N\{j},~x)
)Rp
(N\{j,i},~x)
(S), for all S ⊆ N \ {i, j}, S 6= ∅.
Proof. Fix n ≥ 3, Starting with any game 〈N, v〉, first remove player i ∈ N and next player
j ∈ N \ {i}, taking into account their payoffs xi, xj respectively. By applying (3.2) twice, for
all S ⊂ N \ {i, j}, S 6= ∅, it holds
(
vRp(N\{i},~x)
)Rp
(N\{i,j},~x)
(S)
=
(
1−
s
n− 2
)bn−1s
bn−2s
vRp(N\{i},~x)(S) +
s
n− 2
[bn−1s+1
bn−2s
vRp(N\{i},~x)(S ∪ {j})−
xj
bn−2s
]
=
(
1−
s
n− 2
)bn−1s
bn−2s
[(
1−
s
n− 1
) bns
bn−1s
v(S) +
s
n− 1
[ bns+1
bn−1s
v(S ∪ {i})−
xi
bn−1s
]]
+
s
(n− 2)
bn−1s+1
bn−2s
[(
1−
s+ 1
n− 1
) bns+1
bn−1s+1
v(S ∪ {j}) +
s+ 1
n− 1
[ bns+2
bn−1s+1
v(S ∪ {i, j})−
xi
bn−1s+1
]]
−
s
(n− 2)
xj
bn−2s
=
(
1−
s
n− 2
)(
1−
s
n− 1
) bns
bn−2s
v(S) +
s
(n− 2)
s+ 1
(n− 1)
bns+2
bn−2s
v(S ∪ {i, j})
+
(
1−
s
n− 2
) s
(n− 1)
bns+1
bn−2s
v(S ∪ {i}) +
s
n− 2
(
1−
s+ 1
n− 1
) bns+1
bn−2s
v(S ∪ {j})
−
s
(n− 2)
xi
bn−2s
−
s
(n− 2)
xj
bn−2s
.
The path-independence property is deduced from the symmetry of the above expressions
containing either i or j.
Lemma 3.3 (cf. [2]). If a value σ satisfies COV, and SYM, then σ is standard for two-
person games, i.e. σ({i, j}, v) =
(
v({i}), v({j})
)
+ 12
(
v({i, j})− v({i})− v({j})
)
(1, 1).
Lemma 3.4. The additive efficient normalization of a semivalue associated with weight vector
pn verifies RGP with respect to the p−reduced game of (3.2).
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Proof. For a given game 〈N, v〉 and any player i ∈ N , by the relationship between the additive
efficient normalization ESE(N, v) and the Shapley value Sh(N, v) in Theorem 2.3, we have
for all i ∈ N , for all j ∈ N \ {i} and ~x = ESE(N, v)
ESEj(N, v) = Shj(N,Bv) and ESEj(N \ {i}, v
Rp
(N\{i},~x)) = Shj(N \ {i},B(v
Rp
(N\{i},~x))).
So
Shj(N \ {i},B(v
Rp
(N\{i},~x))) = Shj(N,Bv), for all j ∈ N \ {i}
implies the RGP of ESE(N, v) with respect to the p−reduced game 〈N \ {i}, vRp(N\{i},~x)〉.
Considering the RGP of the Shapley value on the B−scaled game, it follows that
Shj(N,Bv) = Shj(N \ {i}, (Bv)
R
(N\{i},~y)) for all j ∈ N \ {i} and ~y = Sh(N,Bv).
It is sufficient to show 〈N \ {i},B(vRp(N\{i},~x))〉 = 〈N \ {i}, (Bv)
R
(N\{i},~y)〉. For any coalition
S ⊆ N \ {i},
(Bv)R(N\{i},~y)(S) =
(
1−
s
n− 1
)
(Bv)(S) +
s
n− 1
[
(Bv)(S ∪ {i})− Shi(N,Bv)
]
=
(
1−
s
n− 1
)
bns v(S) +
s
n− 1
[
bns+1v(S ∪ {i})− ESEi(N, v)
]
= bn−1s v
Rp
(N\{i},~x)(S)
=
(
B(vRp(N\{i},~x))
)
(S),
where the last but one equality is due to (3.2). This completes the proof.
Theorem 3.5. The additive efficient normalization of a semivalue is the unique value on G
which possesses COV, SYM, and RGP with respect to the p−reduced game of (3.2) associated
with the weight vector pn.
Proof. A semivalue as well as its additive efficient normalization verifies inessential game
property. The linearity and inessential game property imply COV of its additive efficient
normalization. By Theorem 2.2 a entry in the matrix MESE is only related to the size of the
coalition S and the relationship for the player i is a member or non-member of the coalition
S. Together with Lemma 3.4, the additive efficient normalization of a semivalue verifies three
listed properties.
Now we treat the unicity proof. Let σ be a value on G that possesses COV, SYM, and
RGP with respect to the reduced game of (3.2). We prove by induction on n that σ(N, v) =
ESE(N, v) for any game 〈N, v〉. The case n = 2 follows from Lemma 3.3. Thus, let 〈N, v〉 ∈ G
with n ≥ 3 and suppose that
σ(M,w) = ESE(M,w) for all 〈M,w〉 ∈ G with 2 ≤ m < n.
Define 〈N, u〉 ∈ G by
u(S) := v(S)−
∑
j∈S
σj(N, v) for all S ⊆ N.
Since both values σ and ESE possess COV, we have
σj(N, u) = 0 for all j ∈ N and ESE(N, u) = ESE(N, v)− σ(N, v).
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To show that σ(N, v) = ESE(N, v), it is equivalent to show that ESEj(N, u) = 0 for all
j ∈ N . By induction and RGP, we have
ESEj(N \ {i}, u
σ) = σj(N \ {i}, u
σ) = σj(N, u) = 0 for all j ∈ N \ {i},
where uσ is the p−reduced game of (3.2) corresponding to the game 〈N, u〉 and the value
σ(u).
We denote Γij = {S ∈ 2
N | i ∈ S and j /∈ S} and Sc = N \ S for all S ⊆ N . Put
rns =
s!(n−s−1)!
n! , so that r
n
s = r
n
n−s−1. In the following, we deduce ESEj(N, u) = 0 from
ESEj(N \ {i}, u
σ) = 0.
By the formula of the additive efficient normalization ESE(N, v) of the semivalue SE(N, v)
associated with pn in Corollary 2.6, we have
0 = ESEj(N \ {i}, u
σ) =
∑
S⊆N\{i,j}
rn−1s
[
bn−1n−1−su
σ(N \ {i} \ S)− bn−1s u
σ(S)
]
=
∑
S⊆N\{i,j}
rn−1s
[ s
n− 1
bnn−1−su
(
(S ∪ {i})c
)
+ (1−
s
n− 1
)bnn−su(S
c)
− (1−
s
n− 1
)bnsu(S)−
s
n− 1
bns+1u(S ∪ {i})
]
= (n− 1)−1
∑
S⊆N\{i,j}
rn−1s
{
s
[
bnn−1−su
(
(S ∪ {i})c
)
− bns+1u(S ∪ {i})
]
− (n− s− 1)
[
bnsu(S)− b
n
n−su(S
c)
]}
= (n− 1)−1
∑
T∈Γij
(t− 1)rn−1t−1
[
bnn−tu
(
T c
)
− bnt u(T )
]
+ n(n− 1)−1
∑
S⊆N\{i,j}
rns
[
bnn−su(S
c)− bnsu(S)
]
= n(n− 1)−1
∑
T∈Γij
rnt
[
bnn−tu(T
c)− bnt u(T )
]
+ n(n− 1)−1
∑
S⊆N\{i,j}
rns
[
bnn−su(S
c)− bnsu(S)
]
+ (n− 1)−1
∑
T∈Γij
(
(t− 1)rn−1t−1 − nr
n
t
)[
bnn−tu(T
c)− bnt u(T )
]
= n(n− 1)−1ESEj(N, u)− (n− 1)
−1
∑
T∈Γij
rn−1t−1
[
bnn−tu(T
c)− bnt u(T )
]
.
Thus,
ESEj(N, u) = n
−1
∑
T∈Γij
rn−1t−1
[
bnn−tu(T
c)− bnt u(T )
]
for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j.
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By interchanging the players i and j, we obtain that for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j,
ESEi(N, u) = n
−1
∑
T∈Γji
rn−1t−1
[
bnn−tu(T
c)− bnt u(T )
]
let S = T c, = n−1
∑
S∈Γij
rn−1n−s−1
[
bnsu(S)− b
n
n−su(S
c)
]
= −n−1
∑
S∈Γij
rn−1s−1
[
bnn−su(S
c)− bnsu(S)
]
= −ESEj(N, u).
From this and n ≥ 3, we conclude that for any three players i, j, k ∈ N we have on the one
hand, ESEi(N, u) = −ESEk(N, u) = ESEj(N, u). Hence, ESEj(N, u) = −ESEj(N, u). It
follows that ESEj(N, u) = 0 for all j ∈ N .
This completes the proof of uniqueness.
References
[1] Driessen, T.S.H., (1985), A new axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value, Methods
Operations Research 50, 505-517.
[2] Driessen, T.S.H., (1991), A survey of consistency properties in cooperative game theory,
SIAM Review 33, 43-59.
[3] Driessen, T.S.H., (2006), Associated consistency and values for TU games, University of
Twente, Department of Appliecd Mathematics, Memorandum 1795.
[4] Dubey, P., Neyman, A. and Weber, R.J., (1981), Value theory without efficiency, Math-
ematics of Operations Research, 6, 122-128.
[5] Maschler, M., (1992), The bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus, in: Handbook of Game
Theory with Economic Applications, (Aumann, R.J. and S. Hart, eds.) Volume 1. Ams-
terdam: Elsevier Science Publishers, 591-667.
[6] Ruiz, L.M., Valenciano, F., and Zarzuelo, J.M., (1998), The family of least suqare values
for transerable utility games, Games and Economic Behavior 24, 109-130.
[7] Shapley, L.S., (1953), A value for N-person games, in: Contributions to the theory of
games II. (Kuhn, H.W. and A.W. Tucker, eds.) Princeton: Princeton University Press,
307-317.
[8] Sobolev, A.I., (1973), The function equations that give the payoffs of the players in
an n−peson game (in Russian), in: Advances in Game Theory (Vilkas, E. eds.) Izdat.
”Mintis”, Vilnius, 151-153.
[9] Xu, G., Driessen, T.S.H., and Sun, H., (2006), Matrix analysis for associated consistency
in cooperative game theory, University of Twente, Department of Applied Mathematics,
Memorandum 1796.
[10] Xu, G. and Driessen, T.S.H., (2006), Matrix approach to the Shapley value and dual sim-
ilar associated consistency, University of Twente, Department of Applied Mathematics,
Memorandum 1797.
11
Appendix 1: The Alternative Proof of Proposition 3.2.
The Alternative Proof. Fix n ≥ 3, Starting with any game 〈N, v〉, first player i ∈ N is
removed and next player j ∈ N \ {i}, taking into account their payoffs xi, xj respectively. By
applying (3.2) twice,
(
vRp(N\{i},~x)
)Rp
(N\{i,j},~x)
(N \ {i, j}) =
(
vRp(N\{i},~x)
)(
N \ {i}
)
− xj = v(N)− xi − xj ,
and for all S ⊂ N \ {i, j}, S 6= ∅, it holds
(
vRp(N\{i},~x)
)Rp
(N\{i,j},~x)(S)
=
pn−2s
pn−3s
vRp(N\{i},~x)(S) +
pn−2s+1
pn−3s
[
vRp(N\{i},~x)(S ∪ {j})−
1
pn−2s+1
·
xj
(n− 2)
(
n−3
s
)]
=
pn−2s
pn−3s
[
pn−1s
pn−2s
v(S) +
pn−1s+1
pn−2s
[
v(S ∪ {i})−
1
pn−1s+1
·
xi
(n− 1)
(
n−2
s
)]
]
+
pn−2s+1
pn−3s
[
pn−1s+1
pn−2s+1
v(S ∪ {j}) +
pn−1s+2
pn−2s+1
[
v(S ∪ {j} ∪ {i})−
1
pn−1s+2
·
xi
(n− 1)
(
n−2
s+1
)]
]
−
pn−2s+1
pn−3s
·
1
pn−2s+1
·
xj
(n− 2)
(
n−3
s
)
=
pn−1s
pn−3s
v(S) +
pn−1s+1
pn−3s
v(S ∪ {i}) +
pn−1s+1
pn−3s
v(S ∪ {j}) +
pn−1s+2
pn−3s
v(S ∪ {j, i})
−
1
pn−3s
·
xi
(n− 2)
(
n−3
s
) − 1
pn−3s
·
xj
(n− 2)
(
n−3
s
) .
The path-independence property is deduced from the symmetry of the above items containing
either i or j.
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